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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the denial of a petition for post conviction relief following an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Reed's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in dismissing claim's 8 (c), 8 (d) of Mr. Reed's Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief because the evidence presented met the preponderance of evidence 
threshold sufficient to warrant relief. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
FOLLOWING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. REJECTING PETITIONER'S 
ASSERTION THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v. State, 132 
Idaho 722, 979 P.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1999): 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations upon which 
the request for post-conviction relief is based. Follinus v. State, 127 
Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); See also LC. § 19-4907 
(stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings are 
available to the parties in a postconviction relief case). Once the 
district court has denied or granted the postconviction application 
following a hearing, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to 
the trial court's findings. Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 28, 878 
P.2d 198,202 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. State, 
115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal, findings of 
fact make by the trial court shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, I 18 Idaho 65, 794 P.2d 654 
(Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent and substantial 
evidence produced at the hearing will not be disturbed. Sanchez v. 
State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). 
However, this Court freely reviews the legal conclusions drawn by the 
trial court from the facts found. Id. 
Id. at p. 724-725. 
II I 
II I 
3 
B. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim oflneffective Assistance of Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 1s well 
established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The 
"benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on 
as having a just result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in order to be 
entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-
88; State v. Charboneau, l 16 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Rulings 
In essence there were three claims framed within the pro se Petition, however, only 
two main claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were tried at the evidentiary hearing: 
First, that the persistent violator stature as imposed constitutes a violation of the U.S. 
and Idaho constitutions. 
Secondly, that there was a settlement offer tendered by the State to his court appointed 
counsel prior to the preliminary hearing stage of the case, and, that that offer was not extended 
to Mr. Reed. Furthermore, that had the plea offer been extended the Petitioner would have 
accepted the offer. Under the proposed settlement, if Mr. Reed pied guilty, the government 
would recommend to the district court that he receive a five (5) year prison sentence, with one 
(I) year fixed followed by four ( 4) years indeterminate. In short, Petitioner asserted that 
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counsel never advised him of the plea offer; that as a result the case advanced to a preliminary 
hearing where Petitioner was bound over to district court for further proceedings. 1 
Thereafter, the state withdrew its offer and filed an Amended Information Count II, 
seeking enhanced penalties pursuant to LC. § 19-2514 alleging the Petitioner to be a persistent 
violator of law. (Respondent's Appendix A, Judicial Notice taken pursuant to I.R.E. 201, 
Register of Actions from criminal case, State v. Reed, Ada County Case No. CR-2007-01485) 
Thus, the Petitioner alleges prejudice resulted when he was exposed to a substantially harsher 
penalty due to ineffective representation. 
The district court issued a lengthy decision which described the evidentiary hearing.2 
Petitioner will first detail the court's decision which goes over much of what happened at the 
hearing, and then in the section below, Petitioner will provide more detail which the court 
omitted. 
The Petitioner's second claim deals exclusively with his assertion that counsel, Mr. 
Richard D. Toothman, did not disclose the State's settlement offer, nor did he advise him of 
the potential consequences of rejecting the plea offer. (R. p. 6.) It was not until the Petitioner 
was bound over to district court following the preliminary hearing and the case being 
reassigned to another public defender, Mr. Eric R. Rolfsen, did the Petitioner learn a plea offer 
had been extended. (Tr. Pp. 17-27.) 
While the district court correctly recognized the legal standards necessary for review of 
the issues presented, it incorrectly applied those standards to the facts of this case. This 
1 Petitioner also raised an issue about defense counsel's failure to present mitigation testimony 
at sentencing, but this is not being pursued in this appeal. 
2 Actually, the district court's Final Decision Denying Post-Conviction Relief appears to 
largely be a verbatim repetition of the state's closing argument. (R. p. 28-39.) 
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erroneous application of relevant law resulted in a decision that holds when a criminal 
defendant's attorney fails to convey a plea bargain; there is no avenue for relief from counsel's 
deficient representation. Furthermore, he has no right to effective assistance of counsel m 
arriving at an all important decision, which is deciding when to plead guilty. (R. p. 37.) 
The first area that the Court focused upon was the testimony of the Petitioner during 
the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner testified truthfully of the parameters concerning this 
matter e.g. exactly how, when, and from whom he eventually learned the state prosecutor 
"CAG" had extended a plea bargain for a proposed sentence recommendation of one (I) year 
fixed, four ( 4) years indeterminate. (Tr. pp. 14-49.) 
Secondly, Petitioner's attorney, Mr. Toothman, testified that he had no independent 
recollection of meeting with Reed or conveying to his client the plea bargain. However, the 
district court, on nothing more than an inclination to reject Petitioner's claim ruled "The Court 
finds Reed was not credible at all". (R. p. 35) At best, Mr. Toothman's testimony amounts to 
merely plausible deniability, and at worst a disingenuous attempt to avoid acknowledging 
deficient representation. 
Neither interpretation refutes the Petitioner's claim that the plea offer was extended to 
him prior to the preliminary hearing3, or, that he remotely benefited from adequate counsel to 
fully explain his options and of the serious consequences for going forward. Considering the 
fact Mr. Reed voluntarily turned himself in to law enforcement, openly acknowledged guilt to 
his attorney's for neglecting to update and maintain sex-offender registration. Given the goals 
of representation and of counsel's limited options for developing any viable defense to the 
3 The record reveals that the plea offer became null and void upon proceeding to a full preliminary hearing, and 
the prosecutor withdrew the same on January 9, 2008, by filing Motion for leave to file Info Part 2 
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charge, it cannot be said the government appointed counsel properly advised his client or that 
in light of this information the Petitioner would have then chosen to reject that reasonable 
offer. After all, the Petitioner sought to conclude the case. In light of these facts, it cannot be 
said the Petitioner cogently elected to face harsher penalties only to plead guilty a short time 
thereafter. Nevertheless, this was the erroneous finding of the district court. 
The State argues that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988), Pirro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, (Ct. App. 2008), 
and Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685 978 P.2d 24 I, 244 (Ct. App. 1999) control the 
outcome of this case. The State is incorrect. As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, the 
circumstances in this case are distinguishable from those of the decisions in Aragon, Pirro and 
Cowger courts. In the instant case the plea bargain was never extended, and the Petitioner was 
prejudiced as a result thereof. These are completely different circumstances in that Pirro 
never pleaded guilty and thus could not demonstrate the likelihood he would have actually 
accepted the un-conveyed offer. Had the correct analysis been undertaken, the result likely 
would have been different. 
The ABA criminal justice standards provide that the conclusion of a plea offer should 
ultimately be decided by the defendant. The use of the term "conclude" implies that the 
client's consent is needed whether the decision is to accept or reject a plea offer. While 
Strickland explicitly states that ABA standards "are only guides," the standards support the 
conclusion that Reed's allegations are true, and, that defense counsel's conduct fell below 
reasonable standards. 
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Based on both the ABA standards and the relevant case law, an attorney's failure to 
communicate the government's plea offer to his client constitutes unreasonable conduct under 
prevailing professional standards. 
To meet the second part of the Strickland test, a petitioner must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have 
been different." Strictland, supra at 2068. See also U.S. v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 
1994). Here the Petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that he most 
certainly would have accepted the offer; had he known of it. It is not unlikely, as the district 
court suggests that simply because the Petitioner sought to avail himself of a case outcome 
consisting of probation, that in hindsight one could conclude the Petitioner was unwilling to 
plead guilty. Such an assessment does not stand to reason. 
The record and facts also give rise to a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Reed was 
prejudiced in another important respect by his former attorney's failure to inform him in 
advance of the persistent violator sentence enhancement were he to reject the State's offer. 
Given that the offer was only valid if accepted prior to the preliminary hearing, and that no 
affirmative testimony was presented to the district court to suggest the offer was extended 
before the preliminary hearing was had (November 281\ 2008). Accordingly, had Mr. Reed 
been informed of and accepted the plea offer, the government would have been precluded 
from filing the enhanced penalty charges at that time. Therefore, there is a reasonable 
probability the Petitioner's allegation is true, and in point of fact has shown that, but for his 
attorney's failure to inform him of the plea offer, he would have received a one (1) year fixed 
four (4) year indeterminate term for acceptance of responsibility and would not have been 
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sentenced as persistent violator. The district therefore erred m denying his ineffective 
assistance claim. 
D. Appropriate Remedy 
Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner has demonstrated good cause to prevail on his 
ineffective assistance claim and the district court should have to fashion a remedy that is 
"tailored to the injury suffered and [ does J not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." 
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). 
Since the remedy for counsel's ineffective assistance should put the defendant back in the 
position he would have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred, in certain 
circumstances granting a new trial may not be the appropriate remedy. Several courts have 
recognized that where the ineffective assistance occurred before trial, as in cases where the 
harn1 consisted in defense counsel's failure "to communicate a plea offer to defendant, 
... [granting a] subsequent fair trial does not remedy this deprivation." Caruso. 689 F.2d at 
438 (citation omitted); Turner, 858 F.2d at 1208 (requiring reinstatement of the original plea 
offer unless the prosecution can show nonvindictive reasons for withdrawing the offer). 
Requiring the State to reinstate its original offer would also accommodate the policy 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, where the Court 
held that: 
Id. at 379 
II 
"[t]he Constitution constrains our ability to allocate as we 
see fit the cost of ineffective assistance. The Sixth 
Amendment mandates that the State [or the government] 
bear the risk of constitutionally deficient assistance of 
counsel." 
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Even if one might perceive that the government's competing interest might be infringed by 
requiring that the original offer be reinstated, a contrary result would impermissibly shift the 
risk of ineffective assistance of counsel from the government to Mr. Reed. The Petitioner 
must not be subject to enhanced penalties. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner post-conviction relief Mr. 
Reed's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was clearly supported by preponderance of 
evidence; but for the district court's erroneous application of facts by overlooking the withheld 
plea offer. Mr. Reed requests that this Court vacate the Final Decision Denying Post-
Conviction Relief and reduce his remaining sentence as it deems appropriate, or in the 
alternative, remand his case for further proceedings to include the restoration of the State's 
initial plea offer. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 201 L 
!SI 
Jonathan D. Reed 
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